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Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a technology which is used to identify remote objects embedded with RFID tags by wireless scanning without manual intervention. RFID has attracted attentions in the past few years and such technology has been deployed in supply chains management systems of some major department stores. To promote the adoption of RFID technology and to support interoperability, EPCglobal proposed one of the most important standards EPCglobal Class-1 Gen-2 RFID specification (Gen-2 in brief) [1] , and soon Gen-2 is ratified by ISO and published as an amendment to its 18000-6 standard. The increased functionality of Gen-2 is making this standard a defacto specification for inexpensive tags in the RFID industry. Unfortunately, the Gen-2 pays little attention to the security and privacy issues. Duc [2] has pointed out that Gen-2 is inherently vulnerable to eavesdropping under wireless communication environment. Moreover, the Gen-2 based EPC code is fixed and sent out unscrambled that make the tags easily be tracked.
User privacy may be violated when RFID systems are susceptible to unauthorized attackers [3] . In order to prevent RFID tags from leaking messages, some improved physically and cryptographically schemes are proposed [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Physical improved schemes, such as tag killing, Faraday cage, active jamming and blocker tag, etc. [3] , are too expensive to large-scale use in practice [3] . In cryptographic schemes, the protocol using public-key operations [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] is not suitable for low-cost tags due to the limited resource. Hash function can be efficiently implemented in low-power hardware, but it is still beyond current capability of the Gen-2 tag. In particular, Gen-2 merely provides an on-chip 16-bit pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) and a 16-bit cyclic redundancy code (CRC). It does not accept cryptographic Hash function like MD5 and SHA-1. Yksel [9] presented a novel Hash solution with around 1.7K gates, but it doesn't pass the strict security analysis until now.
Generally speaking, Gen-2 does not support public-key and Hash operations. So Gen-2 based RFID security authentication protocols cannot employ encryption function or hash function. Only lightweight algorithms supported by Gen-2 can be used, such as bitwise operations, CRC operation, or PRNG operation.
We focus on schemes that merely take use of the available algorithms [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . But there is a common problem in these schemes. As we know, provable secure methods cannot be used in Gen-2 based protocols for encryption or hash functions are not supported. Then the problem is how to prove the security of the presented schemes. To solve this problem, the authors [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] argued that their protocols protect against the threats in the RFID systems by qualitative analysis. However, two other problems are brought out: which threats should be protected against and how to judge the correctness of the analysis. In this paper, we summarize all the security requirements threats mentioned in the existing Gen-2 based authentication protocols [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] as an enhancing standard, and introduce BAN logic based proof and AVISTA verification method as the formal proofs to support the security analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the enhanced security standard and reviews current Gen-2 based RFID protocols [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . In Section III, we give a short review of Chien's protocol [10] and then point out its drawbacks. In Section IV, we improve Chien's protocol to meet the Enhanced Security Standard. Section V analyses the improved protocol and time complexity. And proves its correctness by using BAN logic, verifies its authentication and secrecy by formal verification toolkit AVISPA. Finally, we conclude the paper in section VI.
Related Work and Enhancing Security Standard
In this section, we first investigate the security properties that existing Gen-2 based authentication protocols have discussed. Chien's protocol [10] was the first protocol conforming to Gen-2 specification. He believed security protocol should have these properties: ①Privacy, ②Anonymity, ③Resist to reply attack, ④Resist to DOS attack and ⑤forward secrecy. Then Wu [11] thought it should have the ability of resisting to Backward Security. Besides, Pedro [12] has proposed an 8 ⑥ security indicators in 2009 which contains ①②③④⑤ in Chien's protocol and supplement 4 requirements: ⑦Data Confidentiality, ⑧Mutual Authentication, ⑨Forgery Resistance and Data ⑩ Recovery. These 10 security properties contain all the requirements discussed in the related papers [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Therefore, we think that these10 security indicators are required in the security protocol for RFID system, and we denote it as Enhancing Security Standard.
Enhancing Security Standard: The Gen-2 based authentication protocol should meet the following 10 security requirements: ①Privacy, ②Anonymity, ③Resist to reply attack, ④Resist to DOS attack and forward secrecy, forward secrecy, Data Confidentiality, Mutual Authentication, ⑤ ⑥ ⑦ ⑧ Forgery Resistance and Data Recovery. ⑨ ⑩ Tabal 1. Security Properties of Existing Protocols Chien [10] Pedro [12] Kart [13] Chen [14] Cai [15] Choi [16] Sun [17] ①Privacy Table 1 were abstracted from the existing publication, in which they reported their own work and discussed the others' properties. But there are two exceptions. First, security properties in Chien's Protocol are not met as he claimed and the difference will be illustrated in Section 3. Second, Choi [16] has shown that his scheme is good at Tag Forgery Resist while he doesn't discuss the Forward Secrecy, Forgery Resist and Anonymity in his paper. And we didn't find the analysis of Choi [16] ' 2 M by formula (1):
M , he sends ' 2 M , ' 3 M to T. After receiving ' 2 M , ' 3 M , T will compute and obtain 
Chien's Protocol and Security Analysis
In this Section we analyze Chien's protocol [10] and take the analysis as a preparation for designing protocol with enhancing security. Chien's protocol is Forward Secrecy in the phase of keys update, but it does not consider the Forward Secrecy in the response phase when messages transmitted from tag to reader. As an earliest Gen-2 based mutual authentication protocol, Chien [10] did not also consider Data Confidentiality, Forgery Resistance and Backward Security . In the following, briefly reviews Chien's RFID mutual authentication scheme at first.
Initial Setup and Authentication Process
Before being put into use, each RFID tag is assigned a global unique identifier, such as production name, production date, and so on. Chien's Protocol uses symmetric key to achieve mutual authentication between tags and the server and the symmetric cryptograph system should be initialized. Thus, the protocol consists of two phases: the initialization phase and the authentication phase.
For every tag Fig. 2 . The detailed scenarios are described as follows: 1 N is a random nonce. 2 N is a random nonce.
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Security Analysis
Chien assumed that the channel between server and reader is secure, while the channel between reader and tags is insecure and subject to eavesdropping or modification. When considering the Enhancing Security Standard, we will find that Chien's protocol does not meet Tag Forgery Resistance, Anonymity, Data Confidentiality, Forward Secrecy and Backward Security. The details are shown in Proposition 1~5 as follows: Proposition 1. The leakage of the value of CRC(
Resistance not guaranteed. Proof: From the assumptions of Chien's protocol, we know that reader and tag communicate via an insecure channel. Thus, the exchanged plaintext 1 M can be obtained by an attacker. By using the lemma of CRC [18] (where n is the bit length of B):
and 1 M , the attacker gets Eq.(2): M before the next successful authentication as follows:
K Then S will be spoofed successfully when verifying. Hence the protocol does not guarantee Tag Forgery Resistance.
Proved＃
Proposition 2. Tag Anonymity of Chien's protocol not guaranteed due to a constant value. Proof: Form Proposition 1, we know an attacker can obtain the value of CRC(
Note that the value of CRC(
K is a constant, that is, the message 1 M can be transformed into a constant. When the attacker traces the constant, tag tracing happens, and user location is revealed. Therefore, Anonymity is not guaranteed.
Proposition 3. Chien's protocol has no Data Confidentiality, Forward Secrecy and Backward Security.
Proof: From two continuous sessions eavesdropped, the attacker can obtain the following four values:
By using the lemma of CRC in Proposition 1, the attacker calculates (3)  (5), Thus
holds. Since he knows 
Then reader-to-tag authentication will be performed successfully. Hence Server Forgery Resistance is not met. Furthermore, this attack will make authentication key and access key update illegally. As a result, Data Confidentiality is not guaranteed. Proved# By using Eq. (8):
which is changed from Eq. 
Improved Chien's Protocol
From the analysis in section III, we find that Chien's protocol did not well satisfy the Enhancing Security Standard. To solve the problem, in this section we presents an improved version which is shown in Fig.3 . The details are as follows. N is a random nonce. 
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Analysis of the Improved Protocol and the Formals
We present a detailed security analysis to show that the improved protocol meets the Enhancing Security Standard. Then we prove the correctness of the improved protocol by formal method based on BAN logic. Moreover, we verify the authentication and secrecy by formal verification with AVISPA toolkit.
Analysis of the Improved Protocol
In Section IV, we analyze Chien's protocol and show that the protocol does not meet 5 properties. Now we show the improved protocol basically meets these 5 properties.
Tag Anonymity: The location privacy of tag holders can be revealed when the tag's answers are constant. Specifically, location privacy can be more significant when a certain tag is exposed to longterm tracking. It is therefore crucial to make all the information sent by the tag anonymous. As we have seen, in the mutual-authentication stage, the tag generates a nonce, by which all the transmitted messages are encrypted. In addition, the attack like that in Proposition 2 can not succeed without the nonce. Tag anonymity is guaranteed and privacy location of the tag owner is not compromised.
Forward Secrecy:
Forward security is the property that guarantees the security of messages sent in this session will be valid in the next session. Since the key updating is fulfilled after the mutual authentication, and the attacker can not obtain _i
P by using the method in Proposition 4, a security breach of an RFID tag will not reveal data previously transmitted.
Backward Security: Backward Security is the property that guarantees the security of messages sent in future session when the tag is compromised in current session. In Chien's protocol, an attacker is prone to update _i M ) to a reader query. However, it is hard to compute such a valid pair without knowledge of 2 N , so the situation in Proposition 1 will not happen. When an attacker obtains two continuous sessions like that in Proposition 3, he will not get the value of _i P . If an attacker does succeed in modifying this part of the memory, the reader will not recognize the tag. Except physical attacks, Server Forgery attack will result in such modification by illegally updating K x_i and P x_i . However, the improved protocol can resist this attack shown above. Therefore, Data Integrity is guaranteed.
From analysis with respect to these 5 properties above, we find that the improved protocol have 5 properties which are not satisfied in Chien's protocol. Next, we show that the improved protocol also has the properties which are obtained in Chien's protocol.
Privacy: EPC code must be kept secure to guarantee user privacy. The messages containing the code are 2 M and 3 M which can be eavesdropped by an attacker. However, EPC code is encrypted by a nonce 2
P , and an attacker will not obtain these three values which were discussed above. Therefore, only an authorized server and reader are able to access the information associated with the tag.
Resist to Reply attack: An eavesdropper could store all the messages exchanged between the reader and the tag. Then he could try to impersonate a reader, and re-send the messages seen in any of the previous protocol. It may seem that this could cause loss of synchronization between sever and tag, but this is not the case due to the challenge-response technology and the freshness of the random number 1 N and 2 N per session. Resist to DOS attack: If an attacker prevents the fourth flow from reaching the tag, the shared secrets of the server and tag might be out of synchronization, because the server will update the shared secrets while the tag will not. However, in the improved protocol, the server maintains both the old and new values of _ M , which will be analyzed in AVISPA tool in the next subsection.
From the analysis above, we can see that the improved protocol basically meets all the 10 requirements in the Enhancing Security Standard. And with the consideration of Tab.1, we think the protocol may be the first protocol with these 10 security properties. Moreover, the improved protocol is very low in the communication and computation loads. Compared with the original protocol, the improved protocol has the same time of communication, CRC operation and PRNG operation, and only 3 times XOR operation and 1 time Concatenation operation increased in the tag, 3n and n increased in the sever correspondingly, where n is the tag amount in the RFID system.
Formal Proof of Correctness
It's very difficult to ensure the security of a protocol. Non-formal analysis, such as the security analysis in 5.1, can only discover whether the known threats existed, rather than analyze cryptographic protocols comprehensively and objectively. As a kind of formal analysis methods, BAN logic [19] can not only discover the current attacks in cryptographic protocols, but also find out flaws comprehensively and profoundly. Therefore, the formal proof of correctness of the improved protocol based on BAN logic is shown in this subsection.
There are four phases in BAN logic, including Establishment of Idealized Model, Initiative Assumptions, Establishment of Security Goals and Protocol Analysis. BAN logic consists of 19 logical rules. The only six rules used in the paper are as follows:
Message-meaning rule:
Nonce-verification rule:
Jurisdiction rule:
Belief rule:
Freshness rule:
First phase: Idealized the improved protocol The purpose of this step is to transform the improved protocol into an ideal one for the following proof. Due to the secure channel between sever and reader, we regard that they have the same security level. Let B donate sever and reader. Ignoring the plaintext transmitted, the protocol can be idealized as follows: Message 1: EPC . The actual meaning is that they ensure each other's legality through mutual authentication.
Fourth phase: Protocol Analysis
The logic rules and the assumptions will be used by the messages in the first phase to discover the final beliefs held by the parties in the protocol. If the final beliefs contain the goals of the protocol, the protocol is integrated; else, the protocol has flaws. The proof is as follows: 
Formal Verification with AVISPA
The AVISPA (Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and Applications) [20] is a toolkit for the automated validation of security-sensitive protocols and applications. It provides a modular and expressive formal language for specifying protocols and their security properties, and integrates different back-ends that implement a variety of sate-of-the-art automatic analysis techniques. The security protocols specifications are written in the AVISPA's High-Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) [21] . We validate standard authentication and secrecy goals of the improved protocol by using AVISPA model. 1) Specifying the protocol: In our protocol model described in HLPSL, there are three basic roles gen_R, gen_T and gen_S which represent the participant Reader, Tag and Server respectively. In this place, we only present one of the basic roles S shown in Fig. 4 as an example. S waits to receive 1 2 , M M and 1 N from R and then sends DATA M , 3 to R. The DATA is omitted in the HLPSL module.
At the same time the state St of S will be changed from 0 to 1. Here, the type declaration channel (dy) stands for the Dolev-Yao intruder model. Under this model, the intruder has full control over the network, such that all messages sent by the agents will go to the intruder. The intruder may intercept, analyze, and/or modify messages as far as he knows the required keys, and send any message he composes to whoever he pleases, posing as any other agent. RcM2'.RcN1') =|> St':= 1 /\ P' := new() /\ Snd(S.R.xor(CRC(EPC.RcN2'),P')) /\ request(S,T,auth_s_t_n1,RcN1') /\ witness(S,T,auth_t_s_n2,RcN2') end role We analyze following properties which are in the goal section as shown in Fig. 5 . The current version of HLPSL supports the standard authentication and secrecy goals. This is, however, sufficient to specify a large number of problems. For our protocol, we verify two weak authentications. S and T have the mutual authentication property through the authentication of S on T and T on S. 
Concluding Remarks
We point out there are two problems of security protocol in Gen-2 based RFID system: which security properties should be required and how to prove the properties claimed by the schemes. In this paper, firstly, we propose an Enhancing Security Standard including 10 security indicators presented in current Gen-2 based RFID authentication protocols. Secondly, we analyze Chien's protocol, and then present an improved protocol, which is up to the Enhancing Security Standard. The improved protocol still uses CRC operation and PRNG operation supported by Class-1 Generation-2 standard. Analysis shows that the improved protocol basically meets the Enhancing Security Standard. Thirdly, we introduce two types of formal proofs of correctness, mutual authentication and secrecy of the improved protocol. In short, we proposed a security standard, present a scheme, then argue that the scheme is up to the standard by qualitative analysis, formal proving and verification. Obviously, our attribution is limited to a practical solution. We wish the paper will attract the attention of these two problems, and
